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BASQUE NATIONALISM
William A. Douglass

Milton da Silva

University of Nevada

Juniata College

In late 1970 the trial in Spain of sixteen Basques, alleged members
of a separatist group called ETA, provoked a series of events which
journalists have labelled "the greatest political crisis of the Franco
years."

The events in question included a general strike in the two

Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, imposition of a state of
emergency in those areas, fear of a general strike in the nation,
closure of universities, street demonstrations in Madrid and Granada,
pleas of clemency from the Vatican, several foreign governments and a
large number of Spain's intellectuals, and detention of many leaders
of non-Basque political opposition groups.

When the Burgos military

tribunal handed down harsh penalties, including nine death sentences,
the army was placed on alert and all eyes were turned upon Franco who
alone had the power to stay the executions.

In a nation-wide address

Franco defused the situation by commuting the death penalties to long
term imprisonment.
It would be e rroneous to conclude from these events that the relatively obscure Basque nationalist movement is currently striking a
responsive chord throughout non-Basque sectors of Spanish society.

In

fact it would be more accurate to state that a groundswell of popular
support for the accused developed despite their Basque nationalist
pretensions.

The trial at Burgos simply served as a convenient

--

cause celebre for the spectrum of Spanish opposition groups.

However,

if the recent events cannot be interpreted as general approbation for
Basque nationalist aims, it is equally evident that Franco's defusing
of the immediate crisis accomplished little for the ongoing governmental effort to cope with the Basques' challenge to centralist authority
within Spain's political life.

Furthermore, it is likely that Basque

nationalism will continue to grow and that the level of violence will
escalate.

This prediction follows from a consideration of the history

of the Basque nationalist movement.
The Basque country straddles the French-Spanish frontier at a
point where the western range of the Pyrenees meets the Cantabrian
seacoast.

Four of the provinces (Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Alava, and

Navarra) and three of the former provinces (Labourd, Basse Navarre, and
Soule) of the present French Department of the Basse Pyrenees constitute the Basque area.

In terms of size, populationi, and economic im-

portance the Spanish provinces dominate with about 6/7 of the total
land area of slightly more than 20,000 square kilometers and 10/11 of
the total population of 2.2 million persons.

l

While the total land

area is quite small (less than one hundred miles across on either an
east-west or a north-south tangent) the broken nature of the landscape
and the exposure to the sea provide the Basque country with a wide variety of ways of life.

These include pastoralism in the higher mountains,

villages of peasant agricultur.alists in the rolling hills of the northern
regions, large agricultural estates in the flat arid plains of the
southernmost areas, and fishing and merchant marine activities along
the seacoast
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The two Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya and
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Guipuzcoa, the hotbeds of the modern Basque nationalist movement, are
among the most highly industrialized regions of the Iberian peninsula
and enjoy the highest rate of per capita income in Spain (Payne 1967:

85).

Bilbao, the capital city of Vizcaya, is a major financial, indus-

trial, and shipping center for the nation.

Finally, in recent years

tourism has become an important factor in the economy of the Basque area.
These economic resources and activities are distributed unevenly.
The Spanish Basque area has a diversified, broadbased economy, including
agriculture, fishing, light and heavy industry, shipping and tourism.
It is one of the most dynamic regional economies in Spain, which has
meant rapid population growth as migrants from other parts of the nation
flock to the industries of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa (Arana, J. D. 1968:13).
This might be contrasted with the situation in France where the regional
economy of the Basque area, based largely upon pastoralism, peasant agricylture, and a short summer tourist season, is one of the weakest within
the economic structure of the nation. 3

The French Basque area has long

been characterized by a relatively static population (Lhande 1910).
Basque nationalism, in its several forms ranging from the desire
for greater Basque autonomy within the structure of the Spanish and
French states to the aspiration for a free Euzkadi or Basque nation
carved out of Spain and France, is a much greater challenge to Madrid
than to Paris.

The two million Spanish Basques constitute about

7%

of

the national population and in terms of Spain's GNP their importance
far outdistances that of their relative numbers (Linz 1966 :200).
A frequent complaint in the Spanish Basque area is that the Basque
provinces contribute much more to the nation than they receive in return
in the form of services.

A popular Basque protest song likens Spain to a
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2

cow with its muzzle in the Basque country and its udder in Madrid.
France the Basques constitute only about

.4%

In

of the national population

and their economic contribution to the nation is negligible.

French

Basques receive more in the form of governmental services and family
subsidies than they pay in taxes.

Thus, Basque nationalism, both from

the Basques' and central governments' viewpoints, is a much more serious
issue in Spain's political life.

This accounts in part, but only in part,

for the fact that Basque nationalist action and central government reaction to the Basque question is currently concentrated on the Spanish
side of the frontier.
Of the two million inhabitants of the Spanish Basque provinces only
about 600,000 may be regarded as culturally Basque, if ability to use
the Basque language is taken as the defining criterion (Lecuorta 1965).
This situation is the result both of the previously mentioned influx
of non-Basque factory workers and the historical retrogression of the
Basque language and culture out of the southern plains and into the
mountainous regions of the northern portion of the Basque country.
Presently, the language is no longer spoken throughout most of
the southernmost provinces of Alava and Navarra.

These areas have

undergone a large measure of hispanicization and are considerably
less fertile, if not wholly sterile, ground for Basque nationalism.
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, the industrial bastions of northern Spain, remain
the major staging areas for the movement.
But who are the Basques and upon what grounds do they argue their
claims for greater autonomy or outright nationhood?

The Basque country

has lacked political sovereignty since the Middle Ages, consequently the
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BasCl.ues lack a political identity as recognized by the community of
nation3.

However, their claim to ethnic uniCl.ueness within the broad

panorama of European peoples and cultures is particularly strong.

The

testimony of their language, which linguistics have as yet been unable
to relate to any other

(Gallop 1930a), their blood type frequencies

(Levine 1967: 45), which physical anthropologists find to differ radically from those of surrounding European populations, and the evidence
of the archaeological record, which suggests that the Basques were in
situ in the Pyrenees well before the subsequent invasions of Western
Europe of Indo-European speaking tribes, invasions which were to shape
the ethnographic makeup of most of Europe as we know it today, all
strengthen the Basques' claim to a unique ethnic identity.

Not to be

disregarded is the Basques' own awareness that they differ from other
Spaniards and Frenchmen--an identity which leads Basque nationalists
and Basque contrabandists alike to take the French-Spanish frontier
lightly.

It is this sense of ethnic awareness translated into poli-

tical activism which fosters the climate in which Basque nationalism
persists.
While modern day Basque nationalism, with a penchant in at least
some circles to work for political separatism, is essentially a
twentieth century phenomenon, for the ardent nationalist the historical
antecedents of the movement are not to be reckoned in years or even
centuries, but rather in terms of millenia.

The annals of Strabo

provide accounts of the ferocity of resistance to Roman rule by at least
some of the mountain tribes of the present day Basque area.

Basque

resistance was equally successful against later Visigothic, Frankish
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and Arab invaders.

By the tenth century the powerful kings of Navarra

had established and consolidated a kingdom which encompassed all of the
present day Basque area, as well as other parts of southern France and
northern Spain.

However, with the exception of the short-lived reign

of Sancho El Mayor from the 1000 to 1035, political organization in the
Basque country showed a tendency for fragmentation and internecine
warfare.
By the twelfth century the kingdom of Navarra had been reduced to
an area which approximates the present day Spanish province of Navarra
and a small area of the French Basque country known as Basse Navarre.
The present day Spanish Basque provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa were
under the aegis of the king of Castille and the province of Vizcaya
had been brought within the orbit of that kingdom through a royal marriage.

The remaining parts of the French Basque country were passing

successively under the control of the Frankish kings to the north, the
kingdom of Bearn to the east, and the crown of England to the west.

By

the sixteenth century the present day French-Spanish frontier was crystallized and the Basques' loss of political sovereignty was complete,
since in 1512 the kingdom of Navarre fell to the Catholic kings and in
1590 Basse Navarre was annexed by the French monarchy.

4

While sixteenth-century developments signalled the end of effective Basque political sovereignty it did not mean the total loss of
political autonomy.
regarded as political

In both Spain and France the monarchies were not
overlords but rather as political allies.

Local

affairs continued to operate in terms of a set of charters, termed fueros
in Spain and

~

in France, duly recognized by the respective central
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governments, and which guaranteed to the Basques a large measure of home
rule and a degree of independence even in foreign affairs (Garcia Venero
1945).

Thus in each of the provinces internal affairs were governed by

local councils.

These councils were made up of popularly elected offi-

cials thus giving the Basque area a kind of primitive peasant democracy
in a p e riod when most of western Europe was characterized by feudal
forms of government.

When these peasant assemblies met to legislate,

great precautions were taken to reduce the influence of the church and the
aristocracy.

Clergymen were prohibited out of hand from attending and

lawyers were excluded on the grollilds that they might use glib oration to
confuse issues.

The local aristocracy and monarch Gould send a repre-

sentative to the proceedings but solely in the capacity of observer
without either voice or vote.

Furthermore, the king was required to

attend personally or to send a repr e sentative to swear to uphold the
foral privileges.

Other aspects of the charters further underline the

fact that the Basque provinces were not completely integrated politically into either Spain or France.

The local c ouncils controlled the

budget for such internal affairs as road building and the school
system.

The Basques were free from taxation, from customs duties, and

from conscription into the army for the purpose of fighting outside
of the Basque area (Altamira 1949: 336).
In some cases the Basques were treated by the central power as a
foreign government.

The Basques were allowed to establish customs

houses along the Ebro to tariff in-coming Spanish goods.

In the six-

teenth century, Basque commercial interests, along with other "foreign
interests," were denied access to the Spanish trade with the New World
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colonies (Gallop 1930b: 495).
tion.

The court of Navarra continued to func-

The Spanish crown sent a viceroy to Navarra (the only such crown

authority outside of the New World colonies).

The Spanish king Ferdin-

and VII was also known as Ferdinand II of Navarra.

French Basques and

Spanish Basques were allowed to enter into agreements with one another
to remain neutral in wars between Spain and France.

They were also

able to send diplomatic missions to other foreign governments to negotiate commercial treaties.
This state of affairs was never totally acceptable to the central
governments of Spain and France.

However, despite several attempts

to abrogate Basque privileges, the charters remained in effect until
the end of the eighteenth century in France and the mid-nineteenth
century in Spain.

The French Basque fors succumbed to the centralist

philosophy of the victors in the French Revolution.

Measures which

were more designed to undermine the power of the French aristocracy
proved equally prejudicial to French Basque regional autonomy.

While

the measures were resisted both through oratory in Parliament and
occasional armed resistance in the Basque c01mtryside, the French
Basques were stripped of all their privileges and the area was itself
incorporated into the new Department of the Basse Pyrenees with the
seat of government being conceded to Pau, the Bearnais city to the east.
In Spain the eighteenth century was characterized by the ascension of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne.

The Bourbons were parti-

c1l1arly centralist minded and launched several political assaults
upon Basque privileges.

With the early nineteenth-century advent of

a liberal regime in Madrid, state centralization became an overriding
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national goal in Spain.

The Basques aligned their cause of regional

autonomy with the Church's fear of a liberal government and the frustrations of the followers of Don Carlos, a pretender to the Spanish
throne.

This coalition, known as the Carlists, initiated a civil war

against Madrid. 5

The First Carlist War ended in 1839 with the defeat

of the Carlist forces.

In the subsequent treaty of Vergara, the court

of Navarra was abolished but the Basques received a promise of respect
for their traditional liberties.

However, a rider clause to the effect

that the fueros would be respected insofar as they did not prejudice
Spanish constitutional unity opened the door to renewed attacks on
Basque autonomy (Garcia Venero 1945: 94).

By the 1870s the Carlists

were again in a position to trigger a civil war.

However, they went

down to defeat and this time most of the foral privileges were simply
abolished.
The Basque provinces, and particularly Navarra, were the main
staging area for Carlism and, throughout the nineteenth century, constituted the backbone of the movement.

This penchant for Carlism re-

flected a strong conviction on the part of the Basques that the best
means of protecting their political autonomy was to control the reins
of government in Madrid.

If the Basques' adherence to the Carlist

cause constituted rebellion against Madrid, this rebellion was not
tinged with separatist overtones.

In short, the two Carlist wars re-

present recourse to violence in order to effect change within the political life of the Spanish nation.
The two Carlist wars, which were largely fought in the Basque provinces, decimated the countryside, encumbered the population with huge
debts in the form of war retributions, and left a standing army of
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occupation.

It also created a climate of intimidation aimed at under-

mining Basque culture through such methods as outlawing the language
in the printed media.

Therefore by the end of the nineteenth century

Spanish Basques were faced with the fact that with stunning rapidity
they had lost the fueros and their leadership, and their culture was
under attack in their very homeland.
It was out of this climate that the modern Basque nationalist
movement was born.

The movement was essentially the product of an

urban environment and led by urban people, particularly from Bilbao,
the capital city of Vizcaya, and San Sebastian, the capital of Guipuzcoa.

This fact arouses curiosity when we consider that by the turn

of' the present century both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa were undergoing
rapid incustrialization, a development which attracted to those provinces a large influx of' Spanish laborers. 6

Consequently, the Basques

had become a minority group in their own urban centers and the Basque
language was heard but rarely on the streets of Bilbao and San Sebastian.

Among most Basque intellectuals the language was denigrated as

the "language of' the stable" and was never employed for literary purposes or commerce, or in the school system.

For example, the Basque

provinces produced three titans of'the famous literary generation of

1898, Miguel de Unamuno, Pio Baroja, and Ramiro de Maeztu; none of
these men, however, wrote in Basque.

So we find that by the end of the

nineteenth century the true stronghold of Basque language and culture
in Spain was to be found in the rural districts of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, where the language was used as the vernacular by peasant farmers
and coastal f'ishing populations.
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Yet Basque nationalism was launched

from an urban platform in 1894 and by urbanites, who were ignorant of the
language and who had but a peripheral knowledge of traditional Basque culture.

The founder of the movement, a young lawyer named Sabino Arana,

learned the Basque language as an adult and then

th~ough

his writings,

set about the task of purifying it of its foreign influences, that is,
of its Spanish loan words.

This exercise in linguistic purism only ser-

ved to deepen the gulf between the urban Basque nationalists and the
native Basque speakers of rural areas.
Sabino Arana launched his movement by penning a virulent attack
upon Spanish institutions and Spaniards.
Spain was in the throes of

losin~

He delighted in the fact that

most of her overseas possessions, and

when Cuba fell to the American forces Arana was arrested for sending a
congratulatory telegram to the president of the United States (Garcia
Venero 1945: 251).

In his book Bizkaya por su independencia 7 Arana

called for the outright independence of the Basques while decrying the
evident process of Castilianization of the Basque country.

Arana

coined the new term Euzkadi to refer to an independent Basque nation.
He advocated the expulsion of all French and Spanish from Basque soil.
He coined pejorative terms to refer to non-Basques and laced his
writings with a racist view that Spaniards were inferior beings while
the Basques were the most ancient pure race remaining in Europe.

He

railed against intermarriage with non-Basques, a position that Miguel
de Unamuno was to denounce as "absurd racial virginity" (Carr 1966:556).
Arana struck a responsive chord among some sectors of the urban
middle classes, students, and the Basque clergy.

He was, however,
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faced with a degree of apathy in the rural areas and with outright
hostility from most Basque industrialists who feared government retaliations against the Basque country (Payne 1964: 411 ; Garcia Venero
1945: 227, 251).
lived.

Arana's personal career was both hectic and short-

As the prime mover in the movement he would found a journal or

a newspaper from time to time, publish a few issues ,and then suffer
governmental censorship and, in some instances, imprisonment.

Arana's

activist following was always relatively small in numbers, but it is
obvious that he was verbalizing the frustrations of a maj ori ty in
Vizcaya for in 1898 he was elected as a representative to the provincial government.

He was to die shortly thereafter, a young man in his

late thirties, broken by his numerous terms in prison; thus his followers had a ready-made candidate for elevation to the status of martyr
(Basaldua 1953).
While Sabino Arana provided the movement with its martyr, he also
created its organization and programs.

In 1893-1894 he laid the ground-

work f9r a new political force in the Basque country called the Partido
Nacionalista Vasco or Basque Nationalist Party.

About 1893 he wrote the

principles of the party from a Vizcayan viewpoint and with the philo'sophy of Jaungoikua eta Lagi zarra ("God and old laws,,).8
With the death of Sabino Arana in 1903 the formative stages of
Basque nationalism were completed.

From 1903 to 1921 the movement gained

in strength and local political respectability, particular in Vizcaya
where in 1918 the Basque Nationalist Party gained control of the
Diputacion or provincial government.

From the outset there was a

polemic within the ranks of the nationalists concerning the degree to
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which Basque separatism was an attainable or even desirable goal.

A

strong faction argued for agitation for return to the foral system of
government within the Spanish nation.

The nationalists also took a

great deal of interest in international development in Europe and particularly the growing tendency to give the grievances of European
ethnic minorities a serious airing.

In 1916 the Basque nationalists

sent a delegation to the Conference des Nationalites in Lausanne to
press Basque political claims (Garcia Venero 1945: 284).

This notion

that the solution to the "Basque problem" might lie in developments
on the wider European scene continues this day.

Some present day nation-

alists view with hope federalist ideas such as the common market and
the possible political unification of Europe.

The idea is that tradi-

tional nations might be dissolved and membership in such a United Europe
might be along ethnic lines, at which point Basques might press their
claim of ethnic uniquness.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century there was a
notable cultural revival in the Basque country which, if it failed to
jell into a significant literary movement (as was characteristic of
cultural revitalization in Catalonia for example), nevertheless stimulated renewed interest in Basque folklore, folk dancing, prehistory,
and ethnology (Garcia Venero 1945: 279).

The Basque nationalists spon-

sored numerous folk festivals, competitions between bertsolariak (rural
bards), and athletic contests involving traditional Basque sporting
events.

In a different vein the movement sponsored serious scholarship

(Garcia Venero 1945: 395-404), notably in the area of archeological
excavations, the collection of folklore, Basque linguistics, the
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ethnography of rural life, and the sociology of urbanization and social
problems in the industrial zones.

Scholarly journals such as La Revista

Internacional de Estudios Vascos (1907) and Eusko-Folklore (1921) were
founded.

These efforts were to cUlminate in 1919 in the First

Con~ress

of Basque Studies (Primer Congreso 1919) sponsored by the Provincial
Government.
The power base of the Basque Nationalist Party was to remain urban
but the message began to lean heavily upon the use of rural symbols as
a means of invoking traditional values (Abrisqueta 1962).

Since the

rural areas were the last remaining strongholds of the Basque language
and had undergone considerably less influx of non-Basque populations
with attendant Castilianization, the nationalists laced their speeches
wi th praise for the farming way of life and the supposed independent and
honest character of the Basque farmer.

The Basque baserria or farmstead

was elevated to the status of bastion of Basque culture.

The national-

ists also railed against the already discernible twentieth-century tendency of peasants leaving the land, since such a movement threatened to
destroy the last vestiges of Basque culture.

With such an approach it

is probably not surprising that the nationalists enjoyed little success
in radicalizing the very people they purported to defend - the peasants
(Garcia Venero 1945: 396).

Nor is i t too surprising that an urban

nativist political movement would opt for rural symbolism.

It might be

argued that the brute facts of the effects of the urban environment upon
maintenance of Basque culture had become too obvious for anyone to hope
to reverse the trend.

It might also be argued that the nationalists

were in part simply verbalizing the frustrations of too rapid urbanization, a kind of back to nature and traditional values reaction.
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In any event the Basque Nationalist Party enjoyed some initial successes before being forced underground in 1921 under the dictatorship of
Primo de Rivera.

With the new climate of political freedom that swept

Spain with the advent of the Republic in 1931, the Basque Nationalist
Party was able to surface on the national scene.

A major development was

the transfer of control within the party to its younger, more active members.

By 1931 the first generation of Basque nationalists created in

the days of Sabino Arana had aged; and under the repression of Primo de
Rivera many of its members had become disillusioned with attendant fragmentation of the movement.

However, in 1931 a new dynamism emerged under

the leadership of Jose Antonio Aguirre, a young twenty-seven-year-old
lawyer, industrialist, and former president of the powerful youth organization Accion Catolica in -Vizcaya. 9

Aguirre and other young members of

the leadership core successfully compaigned for election to the Spanish
Cortes, or Parliament, in Madrid.

If the first generation of Basque

nationalists had laid the foundations for a Basque cultural revitalization
and achieved local political gains, the second generation converted the
movement into a serious and respectable factor in Spain's political life.
It was also to constitute the leadership in the Basque provinces during
the fateful months of 1936 when Spain embarked upon its most recent Civil
War.
By 1931 the Basque Nationalist Party had wrested control of the
electorate in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa from the traditional Carlist party.
The Basque delegates to the parliament in Madrid began to clamor for
home rule.

In June, 19-32 a congress was held in Pamplona to discuss

adoption of a Statute of Autonomy.

The Navarrese rejected the plan by

a vote of 123 to 109 while the delegates of the other three provinces adopted it.

On November 11, 1932 the statute was approved by a

plebiscite in the three provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya.
The only province which they failed to carry was Navarra, which remained Carlist in political orientation, although even there Basque
nationalism was making great inroads (Toynbee 1937: 4o-4~; Peers
1937: 112).
The Republican government in Madrid, however, failed to act on
the plebiscite despite the fact it had laready granted a Statute of
Autonomy to Catalonia.

Many Basque Nationalists believe that the

Republican government, always suspicious of the Spanish church, distrusted the Basques for their traditional clericalism.

The Basques'

demand for direct relations with the Vatican posed a maj or obstacle
to granting of the statute.

In any event the Spanish Civil War began

in 1936 and the beleaguered Republican government hastily granted the
Basques their autonomy.

In October of that year Aguirre, then the

leader of the Basque delegation to Madrid, was named president of the
Basque government.

Most of Navarra and Alava had already fallen to

the forces of General Franco, but the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya prepared for war, fielded an army, issued passports and a currency,
and sent out diplomatic missions to foreign countries.

This first

Basque government represented a coalition of political forces including
Spanish Republicans, Socialists, and Communists, however, Basque nationalists held the key posts including the presidency.
The effort was to be both painful and short-lived.

The Basque army

was outnumbered and under equipped, and the Basque provinces, along

162

- . ......

--.- -- ----.--------~~--------------

with Asturias and Santander, were cut off from the remaining Republicanheld areas of Spain.

Within nine months Basque resistance collapsed

and the Basque government was in exile in Paris.

Many thousands of

Basques were either in prison camps or in exile.

The aftermath of the

Civil War was extremely difficult for the Basque country.

An occupation

army remained behind, all Basque language pUblications were prohibited,
and it was made illegal to use the language in public.

Persons with

activist records in the Basque Nationalist Party were tried, some of
them receiving prison sentences and others being executed.

10

Therefore,

at the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, those Basque nationalists remaining in Spain were either in prison or paralyzed through
fear into inactivity.

Thousands of nationalists were in exile in France

and many were emigrating to join relatives in the Basque diaspora,
notably in Latin America.

The coalition Basque government continued to

operate in Paris where it propagandized against the Franco regime.

The

Basque Nationalist Party was headquartered in the French Basque area
where most if its efforts were directed toward assisting refugees to
become established locally or to emigrate.

Exiled Basque political

leaders residing in Latin America directed their efforts to radicalizing
local Basques.

They enjoyed considerable success and were able to

found anti-Franco political journals, notably in Buenos Aires, Caracas,
Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City.
A further blow to Basque nationalism came in the form of the German invasion of France.

Aguirre and other members of the Basque govern-

ment were forced to flee out of fear that the German authorities would
extradite them to Spain.

Thus during the Second World War most of the

leadership in both the Basque government and the Basque Nationalist
Party fled to Latin America.

There they were to form nuclei of Basque

resistance, notably in Buenos Aires, Caracas, and Mexico City, which
began to propagandize against the Franco regime (and continue to do so
to this day).

Financing these activities did not prove to be overly

difficult since the Basque community in Latin America constitutes a
wealthy business elite, and many of the nouveau riche Basque businessmen were refugees who were financed by the Basque Nationalist Party.
At the conclusion of the Second World War euphoria swept the
movement, for Franco's days appeared to be numbered.

In the eyes of

the international community Franco was identified with Hitler and
Mussolini.

Spain was boycotted both politically and economically by

the community of nations and exiled Spanish political groups gained
new respectability since they would likely dictate the political future
of the Spanish nation.

The leadership of the Basque nationalists re-

turned to France and planned the details of their return to power.
However, Franco proved to be considerably more resilient than was expected.

He turned Spain in upon itself declaring that the nation would

get along without the rest of the world.
were particularly difficult.

The years from 1945 to 1951

Spain was still smarting from its terrible

Civil War and the imposed economic and political isolation precluded
Spain's participation in the Marshall Plan and frustrated most of its
efforts at self help.
In 1951 the optimism of the Basque nationalists was destroyed.
The United States, pursuing a cold war policy of containment of communism, approached the Franco regime with a request for air bases.
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Franco

exacted in return diplomatic recognition and massive amounts of economic
and military aid.

The American pact spelled the beginning of the end of

Spain's isolation.

Recognition by the U. S. provided Franco with a

modicum of international respectability; correspondingly, Spanish resist\

ance groups such as the Basque nationalists suffered a serious blow.
These developments produced profound disillusionment among the
Basque nationalists.

The movement was no longer the heir apparent to

poli tical authority in northern Spain, but ra.ther was relegated overnight to the status of an unrealistic, outlawed utopian dream.

At the

same time the aging process in the leadership ranks became apparent.
The second generation of Basque nationalists, accustomed to exercising
real political power during the Spanish Republic and the few months of
Euzkadi's existence, now found themselves in the position of initiating
anew the process of politicization at the grass roots level--a task that
would have t .o be carried out in the face of almost impossible odds.

What's

more, the leadership had become increasingly conservative and more given
to moderation in its actions.

Its financia.l support was also derived al-

most exclusively from businessmen and professional persons who were ambivalent on the issue of total commitment to revolutionary activities.
The decade of the 1950s was therefore characterized by decay and indecisiveness in the leadership ranks.

Some died (Aguirre himself died in 1960)

and others simply withdrew from what they regarded, with much bitterness,
to be a lost cause.

At the same time the seeds of schism were blooming

within the ranks of the Nationalists.

By 1954 the leaders of the Basque

Nationalist Party were concerned with revitalization of its youth group
or Eusko Gaztedi (Basque Youth) known as EGI.

Young persons were en-

couraged to become involved in propagandizing by distributing clandestine

165

literature, surreptitiously writing slogans on walls, and placing
Basque flags throughout the Spanish Basque area.

The first sign of

schism appeared when a faction of EGI rejected this moderate course
of action in favor of a hard-line approach.

This group founded a new

organization known as ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna, or Euzkadi and Freedom) which was openly separatist and which announced through its literature that violence on the part of the Franco regime would be met
by violence.
Until the early part of the 1960s, ETA was considerably less
activist that its platform promised.

The new movement was an anathema

for the Basque Nationalist Party which continued to monopolize the
sources of financial support for Basque nationalism.

ETA became in-

creasingly desperate and initiated a series of robberies in the Spanish
Basque provinces.

It also tried to intimidate some of the contribu-

tors to the Basque Nationalist Party.

The early 1960s also witnessed

the beginning of ETA terrorism in the form of bombings which were carefully planned as warnings that would not take human lives.
The early 1960s were also characterized by a parallel, but largely
independent, acceleration of resistance among Basque clergymen.

In

part encouraged by a growing concern within the Catholic Church for
strong stands on the issue of human rights, the young clergymen in
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa began to confront their bishops (whose appointments must be approved by the Franco government and hence are subjected
to political considerations), and engaged in public denunciations of
what they regarded as the perpetration of cultural genocide against
' parls
, h'loners. 11
th elr

166

- - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- -- - -

- --

-

---

- -

In 1960, 339 Basque priests signed a document of protest calling
for a papal investigation of the Basque question.

In many respects the

challenge from the clergy was a more serious problem for Franco than
that of the Basque political organizations.

Good relations with the

Spanish Church. and the Vatican constitute one of the keystones of the
policy of the Franco regime.

In return for Church support Franco makes

a number of concessions including paying the salaries of Spanish
priests and allowing the Church disciplinary control over its clergy.
Consequently, the vociferous priests had to be treated circumspectly
and were in a position to take public stands that were unthinkable for
the most ardent Basque nationalist layman.
The decade of the 1960s was therefore characterized by an acceleration of Basque resistance on two fronts--the civil and clerical.

On

the civil front the ETA organization increased its activities, notably
armed holdups and bombings to the point that by the mid-1960s it had
the strongest claim to leadership of Basque nationalist activism.
By 1967 the first nonwartime deaths plagued Basque nationalism.
members and Spanish police were dying in gun battles.

ETA

In 1968, ETA ass-

assinated Meliton Manzanas, the chief of police of the province of Guipuzcoa.

The response from Madrid was imposition of martial law in Guipuzcoa.

This was quickly extended to Vizcaya.

The police rounded up hundreds of

suspects including many dissident clergymen.

The Basque country was awash

with rumors and accusations of police brutality and tortures.

Convicted

members of ETA received long prison sentences with the prosecution asking
for the death penalty in some cases.
Throughout the 1960s the rift between the ETA and the Basque
Nationalist Party deepened.

For ETA activists the leadership of both the
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Basque Nationalist Party and Basque government-in-exile had grown old
and were locked into a kind of marriage of convenience with the Franco
regime.

That is, in return for a measure of tolerance of their propa-

ganda acti vi ties, the leadership of the established Basque Nationalist
Party and Basque government-in-exile eschewed day-to-day violence as a
legitimate means of attaining its goals while at the same time hedging
on the question of total separatism.

Conversely, the leaderships of

these more established Basque nationalist entities viewed ETA as an upstart whose activities were both immature and ill-timed.

The greatest

fear in the Basque Nationalist Party circles was that ETA would bring
down the full force of the Franco regime upon the Basque provinces, or,
by virtue of committing atrocities, it would alienate the Basque masses
from the cause of Basque nationalism, or both.
To further exacerbate the division, the ETA movement turned sharply to the left of the political spectrum.

Its propaganda became in-

creasingly laced with the notion that the free Basque state of Euzkadi
should be established upon Marxist-Leninist principles.

12

The incompat-

ibility between such a platform and the articles of political doctrine
formulated by Sabino Arana (See Note 8) is obvious.

In point of fact,

the ETA movement has itself been splintered into at least two factions
on the issue of whether the primary goal is Basque nationalism as a
narrowly defined local issue or Basque nationalism as a facet of the
wider struggle of the oppressed peoples of the world--i.e. Basque nationalism as part of an international movement.
While the ideological division between ETA and the more traditional
elements of the Basque Nationalist movement are largely irreconcilable,
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curiously this had not loomed as the major bone of contention between
them.

Rather the major issue remains disagreement over the question

of tactics.

The difference lies at the level of a distinction between

heart and mind, emotions and intellect.

Whereas ETA, through its act-

ivities, mobilizes and vindicates a play upon Basque nationalist emotionalism, the Basque Nationalist Party and Basque government-in-exile,
through their caution, are better able to engage in political pragmatism.
The issue is thus one of patience.

ETA, organized as a kind of hyper-

secret terrorist organization which surely numbers but a few hundred
members, strikes out immediately against perceived injustices of the day;
however, its long range program and political goals remain obfuscated by
lack of organization and clearly defined platform.

The Basque National-

ist Party, on the other hand, counsels patience and is willing to let the
present imbalance of justice go unredressed in the interest of achieving
the long range goal of a return to power in the Basque country.

Conse-

quently, the Basque Nationalist Party concentrates upon organization,
and its membership numbers many thousands both in and out of Spain.

The

party leaders remain impressed with t4e odds agains the success of
Basque nationalism and hence cautions that any attempt at a final push to
overthrow Spanish hegemony in the Basque country must be made only at a
time when there are other propitious events within the political life of
the Spanish nation.

The classic example remains, of course, the exper-

iences of 1936 when the Basque nationalists swept into power on the
coattails of the Spanish Civil War.

The point to be made is that there

is no real difference between ETA and the Basque Nationalist Party concerning the legitimacy of the use of violence.

Rather the difference lies

in the perception of the pragmati cs of resorting to violence.

ETA

employs violence as a daily tool of intimidation, the Basque Nationalist Party views violence as a one-shot means of regaining power-a shot which should only be fired when the chances of success are much
greater than at present.
The division over tactics is best exemplified in the dilemma of
the 1960s for EGI, the youth organization of the Basque Nationalist
Party.

As we have seen, ETA was born through a schism in EGI.

As

ETA became increasingly activist, EGI was torn between the appeal that
activism seems to hold for the young and its continued adherence to
the goals of the Basque Nationalist Party.

Thus, due to the challenge

and appeal of ETA activism, the 1960s have witnessed an acceleration
in EGI activism.

The Basque Nationalist Party, while not particularly

happy with the situation, has had to Underwrite acceleration of EGI
activities, if for no other reason than to stem the tide of possible
defections among the ranks of its younger members.

The fact that this

increase in EGI activism coincides with a general aging in the leadership generation (the generation of 1931) of the Basque Nationalist
Party, suggests that the Party is likely to play an increasingly activist role in the future.
The disagreement between ETA and the Basque Nationalist Party
(with its youth group EGI) has led to overt competition.

All three

groups publish and distribute their own clandestine literature and
maintain autonomous leadership structures.

For many years the Basque

Nationalist Party has sponsored an annual peaceful demonstration at
different locations in the Basque country.
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This manifestation is

called Aberri Eguna or Day of the Nation.

In 1966 when the Party

announced that Aberri Eguna would be held in Vitoria (Alava), ETA
promptly called for its own Aberri Eguna in Irun (Guipuzcoa).
However, one might posit that aside from their disagreements there
remains a modicum of common purpose, or at least a relationship of mutual
convenience, between ETA and the Basque Nationalist Party.

There is a

certain ambivalence detectable in the Party's condemnation of ETA activism, since ETA's blows are directed at the common enemy.

Conversely,

it is unlikely that ETA could have survived if it were not for the many
years of effort by the Basque Nationalist Party.

We might say that ETA

is reworking ground already broken by the Basque Nationalist Party.

If

Basque nationalism were an entirely new idea, the extremist tactics of
ETA would likely have pr,o ven to be too radical for the Basque public.
Finally, both groups are fully aware that Basque nationalists are a
minority in a region which percentagewise is but a small part of the
whole of the Spanish nation.

Consequently, regardless of ideological

and tactical differences, at one level each Basque nationalist faction
welcomes the existence of other groups of Basque resistance.
The second front of Basque resistance during the1960s was the
clergy.

Th~

1960 document of protest signed by 339 priests and sent to

the Vatican demonstrated clearly the deep sense of dissatisfaction felt
by Basque clergymen in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

It may be suspected that

many more clergymen who failed to sign the document were nevertheless
in sympathy with its points.

The document was signed by young and el-

derly clergymen alike, and the leaders behind the document were largely
middle-aged priests.

This point is significant since, as we shall see,
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it provides the basis for discerning a striking parallel with developments in the secular movements.

The priests who led this early movement

had witnessed the creation of Euskadi in 1936, many served as chaplains
in the Basque army, and some had suffered incarceration after the war.
Thus, when the 1960 document was formulated, clerical support of Basque
nationalism was not an entirely new element upon the scene.

However,

it should be noted that the generation of Basque clergymen who lived
through the Spanish Civil War were always extremely guarded about providing official support for the Basque government or Basque lI"1tionalist
Party.

Accusations to the contrary, the priests were never involved

directly in the Basque Nationalist Party, nor did they, as a group, take
stands on political matters regardless of the personal predilections of
each.

The Basque Nationalist Party itself refuses to admit priests as

members.

Any public support of the nationalists took the form of moral-

izing about their human rights rather than commenting upon their political goals.
The 1960 document cast down the gauntlet before both Franco and
the Basque church hierarchy.

In the early 1960s the clergy, young and

old alike, acted in concert and challenged both the Basque bishops and
the State, but the attacks remained strictly on a plane of defense of
human rights.

By the mid-1960s however, the young clergy was out-

stripping the elder generation in vociferousness and stubbornness.

At

first hesitantly and then with growing determination the government
began to detain and jail activist priests.

At the same time, young

priests became more identified with secular political groups, and
rumors increased to the effect that young priests were helping fugitive
members of ETA escape into France.
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The young priests openly confronted

the bishops with hunger strikes, demonstrations, and sermons.

Proposals

such as turning in mass resignations or group travel to Rome to picket
the Vatican were given serious consideration.

The radical activism of

the young clergy, and the accelerating response on the part of the
Franco government combined to produce a schism in the ranks of Basque
nationalist-oriented clergy analogous to that between ETA and the
Basque Nationalist Party.

As with the secular resistance groups, the

division amongst the clergy turned upon the question of tactics.

As

with the seculars, persons on different sides of the split were ambivalent towards one another, rather than openly hostile.
In any event, the Franco regime has ceased to brook open oppositioh from the clergy.

It has obviously decided to risk straining re-

lations with the Vatican since priests are arrested for such things as
ill-advised comments in Sunday sermons.

Arrested priests are frequent-

ly tried by military tribunals and there is a new priests' wing at the
prison of Zamora.
As with most historical movements, the closer one gets to the
present the more difficult it is to discern patterning and direction in
the course of events.

It is fair to state that the future course of

political history in the Basque country is far from clear at present.
This statement holds true for the Spanish governmental officials who
are faced with the task of rooting out a political ideal which is
flourishing in its home soil.

Equally, it holds for the Basque nation-

alists who recognize the tremendous odds against the movement, who have
enj oyed considerable recent successes in radicalizing the populace,
but who in the process have exhausted the probable efficacy of peaceful
means of resistance.

One thing is clear, the past ten years have
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witnessed a new commitment on the part of the Spanish government to
extricate the Basque problem from the national political life.

At

the same time it has been a decade of expansion and growth of Basque
nationalism accompanied by factioning which has produced some nationalist groups dedicated to terrorism.

The recent trial in Burgos must

be regarded as a defeat for those (on both sides) who advocate a
peaceful solution to the Basque question.

The fact that a trial of

Basque terrorists could undermine the international respectability of
the Franco regime and tilt Spanish domestic affairs in the direction
of political chaos is a clear moral victory. for ETA.

In retrospect

the trial may have transferred the mantle of leadership of Basque resistance from the more moderate Basque Nationalist Party to ETA.

If

this is the case the Basque resistance forces are likely to up the
ante of violence.
Some Implications
The fundamental importance of ethnic nationalism is acclaimed by
the recent proliferation of separatist movements throughout much of the
world.

13

In many of the developing nations of Asia and Africa the

euphoria that accompanied the demise of colonialism and the political
optimism that characterized the creation of new nations have recently
been deflated by the resurgence and accentuation of tribal or ethnic
differences.

Since, in the words of Lucian Pye, (1967: 183) "political

scientists were intellectually ill-prepared for the collapse of empires
and the formation of new states." scholars began to take another look at
the process of nation-building in Europe thus hoping to get a better
perspective with which to dissect the problems associated with nationbuilding in the new states.
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Many of these studies were both of a
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descriptive and prescriptive nature.

~----~--

In devising models of the inte-

grated political system, and drawing on the European experiences,
students of political development hoped to be able to abstract some guide
lines which would assist the political leaders of the developing societies
to implement integrative policies.
However, it is equally apparent that ethnic nationalism is not restricted solely to "immature" political systems.

With very few except-

ions, nations are ethnically hetereogenous and few have been totally
immune from political demands pressed by one or more ethnic groups enclaved within the national life.

Groups (or at least segments within

groups) such as the Welsh, Scots, Bretons, Flemish, and Basques include
the desire for political autonomy in their platforms.

The claims of

French Canadians, Chicanos, Red Power advocates, some American Jews and
certain Black Americans demonstrate that the political life of North
America is likewise effected by ethnic nationalism.
We would not presume, in the limited context of the present article, to assail or even discuss the entire literature on political development and nation-building.

However, we do believe that the case

study of Basque nationalism may be instructive for political scientists,
particularly those theorizing about political development in nationbuilding, who assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that ethnic
nationalism is like to occur when:
1)

an ethnic group occupies a position of economic deprivation

within a nation, and
2)

when such an ethnic group is isolated either physically or

conceptually from the mainstream of the national life.
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Characterist,ic of this school of thought is that economic development and technological changes will ultimately eliminate sectional
and/or ethnic differences.

Improved communications and, particularly

the greater use of mass media are seen as creating, over time, a
single national pl.:trpose among groups whose interests were traclitionThus Pye (1963: 10) states, "the widely recognized

ally divergent.

problem of creating political concensus in most of the new states, is
in part one of building new and more universal means of national communications, of establishing more effective channels of communications
and transportation so that all segments of the society can become more
closely involved. vrith each other."

Coleman (1960: 345) notes, "the

problem of integration and building concensus in African territorial
political systems is largely a problem of developing patterns of c9mmunications."

While Deutsch (1966: 99) maintains that [what countsL

"is not the absence or presence of any particular variables, but the
presence of sufficient communications facilities."

"When several

populations clusters are united through intervening settlements or
through more communications and more economic activity ... then people
begin to think of themselves as a country" (Deutsch 1969: 6).
In the case of the Basques, however, despite several centuries
of efforts by Madrid and Paris to exert their centralist authority,
a modern ethnic nationalism movement emerged near the turn of the
present century.

In the Spanish Basque instance the movement made

its appearance among an economically privileged group (the Basque
country has enjoyed the highest per capita income of Spain throughout
most of the twentieth century).

Furthermore, the economy of the Basque
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area is integrated almost totally into Spanish economic life.

The major-

ity of Basque products are marketed elsewhere in Iberia and Basque industries are dependent for their labor supply upon extensive in-migration
from other areas of Spain.

The development of the modern Basque national-

ist movement has transpired precisely during a period characterized by a
veritable revolution in the use of communications and mass media.

Today

the movement is gaining in strength despite the fact that even in the
most isolated Basque villages the radio and television set are commonplace
and programming is dominated by a carefully censored centralist political
viewpoint.

Formal education at the primary school level is mandatory in

every Basque village and the curriculum is under the direct control of
Madrid.

Similarly, it is impossible to argue that Basque nationalism is

the product of ethnic group particularistic values.

The movement has

drawn its leaders from the educated urban classes and clergy, persons who
by virtue of their intellectual formation should be precisely the most
likely to have a cosmopolitan world view and hold universalistic values.
In conclusion, we would not deny that further industrialization,
in-migration of non-Basques into the Basque area, and the diffusion of
mass media pose serious challenges to the future viability of the Basque
Nationalist movement.

Basque Nationalists themselves underscore this

point when they occasionally blow up the transmitter which brings Spanish
National Television to their region.

However, we would suggest that the

Basque case (and possibly the cases of other nationalistically inclined
ethnic groups enclaved within the Atlantic community of modern nations)
cast doubt upon the contention that an efficient system of internal
communications is an automatic guarantor of political integration.
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NOTES

IThe population of this area includes a substantial number of
people who are not Basques, people who have immigrated from other areas
of Spain.

The exact figures on the number of Basques are difficult to

come by since both the Spanish or French governments do not make any
distinctions in their census figures.
2For a statistical comparison of the Spanish regions see, Linz
(1966) .
3For a recent discussion of this problem consult Enbata, January
1964.

This is

~

journal of the French Basque nationalist group.

4For more historical information see Gallop (1930b: 495), Ormond
(1925), and Ortueta (1963).
5For a discussion of the Carlist Wars and the ideological basis
of Carlismo see, Carr (1966: 155-196), Herrero (1956), and Schumacher
(1962: 343-364).
6The extent of industrial development in the Basque region is
illustrated by the following figures: in 1877 Spain was producing
1.58 million tons of iron ore, 1.04 million tons of which were prod~ced in the province of Vizcaya,

of the world's output of iron-ore.

By 1900 Spain was producing 21.5%
Of Spain's 252 iron-ore mines, 106

were concentrated in Vizcaya and over 75% of the nation's miners
worked in Vizcaya.

By the turn of the century the Bilbao complex was

the leading producer of steel in Spain (Chilcote 1968).

During the

same period, Basque financial interests grew to the point where Basque
bankers became the single most important financial interest in Spain
(Carr 1966: 435).
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7The complete writings of Sabino Arana are available in the
cently published Obras Completas

re-

(1966).

8The platform of the party was expressed in thirteen articles as
follows:
Article 1 -- Bizkaya, upon entering a Republican confederacy, does so
according to the acceptance of the political doctrine expounded by
Arana Goiri'tar Sabino [Sabino Arana y Goiri] in the slogan Jaungoikua
eta Lagi Zarra, which is explained in the following articles.
Article 2 -- Jaun-Goikua-Bizkaya will be Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman
in all aspects of its internal affairs and its relations with other
peoples.
Article 3 -- Lagi-Zarra-Bizkaya will be freely reconstituted. It will
reestablish, with complete integrity, the essence of its traditional
laws, called Fueros. It will restore the good practices and customs
of its predecessors. It will be constituted, if not exclusively, then
principally, of families of the Basque race. It will establish Basque
as its official language.
Article 4 -- ETA-Bizkaya will be established upon perfect harmony and
accord between the religious and political orders, between the divine
and the human.
Article 5 -- Distinction between Jaun-Goikua and Lagi Zarra Bizkaya will
be established with a clear and marked distinction between the religious
and political orders, between the ecclesiastical and civil.
Article 6 -- Precedence of Jaun Goikua over Lagi Zarra Bizkaya will be
established with a complete and unconditional subordination of the
political to the religious; of the State to the Church.
Article 7
Confederation -- Since Bizkaya is by race, language, faith,
character and custom a sister of Alava, Benabarra [Basse Navarre] ,
Guipuzcoa, Laburdi [Labourd], Navarra and Zuberoa [Soule], it will become allied or confederated with these six peoples to form a whole
called, Euskalerria, but without surrendering its particular autonomy.
This doctrine will be expressed in the following principle: Bizkaya
li bre en Euskalerria libre [Free Bizkaya in a Free Basque Country].
Article 8 -- The Basque confederation will be formed by all of the
Basque states with each entering willingly and with all having the same
rights in the formation of its [the confederation's] foundations.
Article 9 -- The necessary bases for a solid and durable national unity
are: unity of race as far as is possible, and Catholic unity.
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Article 10 -- The essential bases to insure that the Basque states
entering the union will retain equal autonomy and identical faculties
are: freedom to secede, and equality of obligations and rights within
the Confederation.
Article 11 -- Once the Confederation is established each member state
will have the same rights and identical obligations.
Article 12 -- The Confederation will unite its members solely in terms
of the social order and international relations, in all other respects
each will maintain its traditional absolute independence.
Article 13 -- All of the articles in this document and political doctrine are irrevocable.
(Quoted in Garcia Venero 1945: 244-245)
Article 9 reflects the nationalist's dilemma that much of the
population of the Basque country, including many ardent nationalists,
possessed shaky geneological claims to Basque descent.

This fact

lends substance to the somewhat jocular criticism that in order to be
a confirmed Basque nationalist one must possess at lease one non-Basque
last name or be ignorant of the Basque language!
9 For biological material on Aguirre see, Basaldua (1956).

For

Aguirre's views on Basque nationalism and his experiences during the
Civil War, see, Aguirre (n.d.; 1943).
10

For the treatment of the Basque clergy by the Franco regime

see Le clerge Basque (1938), author anonymous.
11

In a letter sent to Pope Paul in 1968, a group of Basque priests

dramatically appealed to the Pope by maintaining that the Basques were
an oppressed minority whose culture was being destroyed by both the
Madrid and Paris governments.

See Anon. (1968).

12 ETA publishes an undergound paper, Zutik, in which the views
of the party are publicized.
13 For a broad discussion of separatist movements see, Connor (1967).
For case studies of separatist movements in Southeast Asia, Wales,
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Scotland, Brittany, Quebec, and Africa, consult Connor (1968), Davies
(1968), Schwartz (1970), Hayward (1969), Wilson (1967), Hargrove (1970),
Mazrui (1969), and Hanna (1969).

For a more theoretical discussion on

the question of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, see Melson and Wolpe
(1970) and Horowitz (n.d.).
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